TRACY BRYANT v. OAKRIDGE EQUINE HOSPITAL, an Oklahoma Corporation

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY STATE OF OKLAHOMA TRACY BRYANT, Plaintiff, v. OAKRIDGE EQUINE HOSPITAL, an Oklahoma Corporation, and MICHAEL D. MAJOR, DVM, Individually, Defendants. PETITION 1. Plaintiff, Tracy Bryant, is a resident of Oklahoma County. 2. Upon information and belief, Defendant Oakridge Equine Hospital is a domestic business operating in Oklahoma County. 3. Upon information and belief, Defendant Michael Major, DVM, is a resident of Oklahoma County and performs professional services at Oakridge Equine Hospital in Oklahoma County. 4. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Article VII, § 7(a) of the Oklahoma Constitution, which grants Oklahoma district courts unlimited original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters. 5. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because Defendants reside in, conduct business in, and committed the acts and omissions giving rise to this action within the State of Oklahoma. 6. Venue is proper in Oklahoma County, Oklahoma, pursuant to 12 O.S. §§ 134, 139(A), because Defendants reside and conduct business in this county and the acts and omissions giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in Edmond, Oklahoma County, Oklahoma. Factual Background 7. Plaintiff is the owner of an American Quarter Horse Association (AQHA) yearling filly named Lucie Lawless ("Lucie"). 8. On or about April 29, 2025, Lucie exhibited tightness in her right front leg. Plaintiff transported Lucie to Oakridge Equine Hospital for evaluation by Dr. Major to determine the cause of the tightness and whether any treatment might be warranted. 9. Lucie arrived at Oakridge on or about May 26, 2025. 10. On May 27, 2025, prior to any treatment being performed, Plaintiff communicated directly with Oakridge staff and expressly instructed that no treatment or procedure was to be performed unless and until Plaintiff first spoke with Dr. Major and provided her consent. Plaintiff specifically stated that she wished to discuss Dr. Major’s assessment and develop a treatment plan before authorizing any care. Oakridge staff advised Plaintiff that Dr. Major would contact her later that day. 11. Dr. Major never contacted Plaintiff prior to performing surgery, and Plaintiff did not authorize any surgical or invasive procedure. 12. At all relevant times prior to surgery, Lucie did not present with a life-threatening or emergent condition, and Plaintiff was readily available to be consulted regarding any proposed treatment. 13. Despite Plaintiff’s express instructions and lack of consent, Dr. Major performed bilateral check ligament desmotomies under general anesthesia on May 27, 2025. 14. Defendants performed the bilateral check ligament desmotomies without conducting any diagnostic testing or work-up to confirm the cause of Lucie’s condition. 15. Defendants performed the surgery without conducting any diagnostic testing or work-up to confirm the cause of Lucie’s condition or the medical necessity of the procedure. 16. Defendants subsequently acknowledged that no diagnostic evaluation was performed at Oakridge Equine Hospital prior to surgery. 17. Plaintiff selected Oakridge based on its public representations that it collaborates closely with horse owners and referring veterinarians and engages in shared decision-making regarding treatment. 18. Those representations were false as applied to Plaintiff’s experience, as Defendants performed invasive surgical procedures without consultation, explanation, or consent. 19. After Lucie’s condition failed to improve following surgery, Dr. Major administered Botox injections into Lucie’s right forelimb on or about June 11, 2025. 20. The Botox injections were administered without Plaintiff’s knowledge or consent, without diagnostic justification, and without disclosure of their purpose or risks, despite Defendants’ prior knowledge that Plaintiff had expressly withheld consent for invasive or experimental treatment. 21. Plaintiff did not learn of either the surgery or the Botox injections until after they had already been performed. 22. When Lucie was discharged from Oakridge on or about June 17, 2025, her surgical incision sites were open, dehisced, and improperly healed, a condition documented by a subsequent examining veterinarian within days of discharge. 23. Subsequent veterinary evaluation determined that the source of Lucie’s tightness did not originate from an issue with her check ligaments, and that surgery was unnecessary. 24. Defendants were aware that Plaintiff was the owner and decision-maker for Lucie, as Oakridge communicated directly with Plaintiff regarding intake, billing, and treatment matters. 25. As a result of Defendants’ unauthorized and substandard treatment, Lucie suffered abnormal scarring, persistent lameness, loss of future competitive potential, and diminished breeding value. 26. Plaintiff incurred substantial veterinary, rehabilitation, and related expenses and continues to incur ongoing costs for corrective care. 27. At all relevant times, Defendants were required to comply with the Oklahoma Veterinary Practice Act, 59 O.S. § 698 et seq., and the Rules of the Oklahoma State Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners promulgated thereunder, including but not limited to Oklahoma Administrative Code §§ 775:10-5-30(2), (14), and (17), which establish minimum standards governing informed consent, diagnostic evaluation, valid veterinarian–client–patient relationships, and the duty to practice veterinary medicine with reasonable skill and safety. 28. Defendants’ conduct violated accepted veterinary standards and duties imposed by the Oklahoma Veterinary Practice Act, 59 O.S. § 698 et seq. COUNT I VETERINARY MALPRACTICE/PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE 29. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 28 as if fully set forth herein. 30. Defendants owed Plaintiff a duty to exercise the degree of care, skill, and diligence ordinarily exercised by veterinarians under similar circumstances. 31. Defendants breached that duty by performing surgery without diagnostics, without consent, without medical justification, and by administering unauthorized experimental pharmaceutical treatment. 32. As a direct and proximate result, Lucie sustained physical injury and permanent impairment, and Plaintiff sustained economic loss including veterinary expenses, loss of market value, and diminished future earnings potential. 33. Defendants acted in reckless disregard of Plaintiff’s rights and Lucie’s welfare, including conduct prohibited by Oklahoma statute and administrative rule governing veterinary practice, entitling Plaintiff to punitive damages pursuant to 23 O.S. § 9.1. COUNT II – VIOLATION OF OKLAHOMA VETERINARY PRACTICE ACT 34. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 33 as if fully set forth herein. 35. The Oklahoma Veterinary Practice Act, 59 O.S. § 698 et seq., and the Rules of the Oklahoma State Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners establish mandatory minimum standards governing the lawful practice of veterinary medicine in Oklahoma. 36. Oklahoma Administrative Code § 775:10-5-30(14) requires veterinarians to practice with reasonable skill and safety, defined as the level of care, skill, and diligence ordinarily exercised by average members of the profession under similar circumstances. 37. Oklahoma Administrative Code § 775:10-5-30(2) prohibits conduct demonstrating willful or careless disregard for the health, welfare, or safety of a patient. 38. Oklahoma Administrative Code § 775:10-5-30(17) prohibits interference between the veterinarian and the client and requires the veterinarian to remain directly responsible to the client for the care and treatment of the patient. 39. Defendants violated these statutory and regulatory requirements by performing surgery without diagnostic confirmation of medical necessity, treating Lucie without Plaintiff's informed consent, administering Botox without therapeutic justification, and disregarding Plaintiff’s authority as the owner and client. 40. Defendants’ violations of the Oklahoma Veterinary Practice Act and the Board’s rules constitute negligence per se and evidence of reckless disregard for patient welfare. COUNT III – BREACH OF CONTRACT 41. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 40 as if fully set forth herein. 42. Plaintiff and Defendants entered into an express and/or implied contract whereby Defendants agreed to evaluate Lucie, communicate findings, and obtain Plaintiff’s consent prior to treatment. 43. Defendants materially breached the contract by failing to perform diagnostics, failing to communicate with Plaintiff, and performing unauthorized procedures beyond the scope of the agreed-upon services. 44. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ breach, Plaintiff incurred damages including charges for unauthorized procedures, costs to remediate resulting harm, and foreseeable consequential damages. Damages 45. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ acts and omissions, Plaintiff has suffered damages in excess of $75,000, including but not limited to the following: (a) veterinary and rehabilitative expenses; (b) loss of futurity earnings of approximately; (c) diminished market and breeding value of the Horse (d) ongoing and future medical expenses; and (e) attorneys’ fees and costs as allowed by law. JURY DEMAND Plaintiff demands a trial by jury on all claims so triable. Dated this 24th day of February, 2026. Respectfully submitted, Segal McCambridge Singer & Mahoney /s/ Gregg J. Lytle Gregg J. Lytle - OBA #20759 6666 S. Sheridan Rd. Suite 230 Tulsa, Oklahoma 74133 Telephone: (512) 476-7834 [email protected] Attorney for Plaintiff /s/ Kimbrell J. Hines Kimbrell J. Hines – FBN 1026028 E-mail: [email protected] Turkel • Cuva • Barrios • Guerra 100 North Tampa Street, Suite 1900 Tampa, Florida 33602 Telephone: (813) 443-2199 Fax: (813) 443-2193 Pro Hac to be Submitted